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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN WINTER 
Daniel Epps* 
Six months before the 2016 presidential election, Harvard Law 
Professor Mark Tushnet charted a course for the future of 
constitutional law on the assumption—one that seemed eminently 
reasonable at the time—that Hillary Clinton would win. It was time 
for liberals to abandon “defensive crouch constitutionalism,” Tushnet 
argued.1 Although the federal judiciary had been controlled by 
conservatives for decades, the time was finally nigh for a long-
awaited, more liberal Supreme Court to aggressively rewrite 
constitutional doctrine.2 Tushnet mapped out a number of priorities for 
the future, including overruling or narrowing a number of disfavored 
precedents and strategically deploying doctrines to aid liberal political 
causes on the ground.3 Yet in closing, Tushnet recognized that he 
might have been jumping the gun: “Of course all bets are off if Donald 
Trump becomes President. But if he does, constitutional doctrine is 
going to be the least of our worries.”4 
Tushnet did not acquit himself particularly well as a chicken-
counter. But as to that last remark, he had a point. Given the great risks 
that many believe Trump’s ascension to the presidency poses for 
American democracy and for the world more generally, perhaps it’s 
silly to be too bothered about what sequences of words might appear 
printed in future volumes of the United States Reports. Still, that 
hasn’t stopped me, like many others, from wondering—and, yes, 
worrying—about the election’s consequences for constitutional 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. For helpful conversations 
and comments, I am grateful to Devon Carbado, Danielle D’Onfro, Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, 
Leah Litman, Greg Magarian, and Ian Samuel. 
 1. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION 
(May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html.  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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doctrine. Particularly, the consequences for the large body of 
constitutional doctrine regulating the criminal justice system that we 
call criminal procedure. 
And here there is reason to worry, at least for those who think that 
criminal procedure should do more to rein in the excesses of the 
American criminal justice system. Given possible changes to the 
Supreme Court’s membership, numerous doctrines currently 
commanding the support of slim majorities could fall or be sharply 
curtailed. At the very least, the Court is unlikely to extend criminal 
procedure doctrine in novel ways in the immediate future. Those who 
were holding their breath for the Court to recognize new rights, or, 
say, to declare the death penalty categorically forbidden—possibilities 
that felt tantalizingly close just months ago, when Hillary Clinton 
appeared on her way to becoming President—are likely to be 
disappointed. 
Given what might have been, criminal justice reformers will find 
these circumstances profoundly disappointing. But this situation has 
important lessons for how we think about constitutional criminal 
procedure—its past, and its future. This Foreword takes stock of where 
constitutional criminal procedure stands given the election’s 
consequences for the membership of the Supreme Court. This forum 
provides a particularly appropriate opportunity for such reflection. 
Though the Supreme Court decided some criminal procedure 
decisions of some consequence in October Term 2016,5 by far the 
most significant event that occurred that Term at the Court was not a 
case but a change in the Court’s membership with the addition of 
Justice Gorsuch. 
In what follows, I offer some predictions on the path of the 
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence and provide some thoughts 
 
 5. By my lights, the most important constitutional cases involving, or at least touching on, 
the criminal process include Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (holding that defendant 
had shown prejudice from his attorney’s errors about the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding unconstitutional a statute 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from using many social media sites); County of Los Angeles 
v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (holding that police officer defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity arising out of a non-fatal shooting); Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (holding 
unconstitutional a state statute requiring defendants whose convictions were overturned to prove 
innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain refunds of fines and fees). Though the cases’ 
implications for criminal justice are not yet fully clear, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), 
which put significant restrictions on Bivens liability generally, might be last Term’s most significant 
constitutional ruling overall. 
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about how criminal procedure scholarship might best respond to the 
future that looms ahead. In my view, present circumstances present an 
overdue opportunity for scholars to reconsider the notion that courts 
are the solution to democratic failure. Instead, energy would be better 
directed at questions of structure, power, politics, and localism. 
I.  THE STORY SO FAR 
To gain some perspective on our current situation, I’ll provide 
here a very brief overview of the broad history of criminal procedure. 
Start with the beginning. The Constitution reflects significant concern 
for criminal justice. Its original text itself regulates the criminal 
process,6 and four amendments of the original Bill of Rights do too.7 
Nonetheless, for the first century or so after the founding, federal 
constitutional law played a relatively small role in regulating 
American criminal justice. At first, federal constitutional law did not 
govern the state criminal process at all.8 And federal criminal law 
represented a small slice of criminal justice generally.9 
Both facts began to change in the twentieth century. Federal 
criminal law expanded as commerce between the states increased and 
as the federal government became hungrier for tax revenue and more 
eager to regulate economic activity.10 And federal constitutional law 
started to have a lot more to say about state criminal justice because 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.11  
Though ratified in 1868, that amendment was not immediately 
understood to impose the Bill of Rights’ requirements on state 
 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury trial guarantee); see also id. art. III, § 3 (regulating 
punishment of treason); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for extradition of indicted criminals between 
states). 
 7. See id. amend. V (Grand Jury, Double Jeopardy, and Self-Incrimination clauses); id. 
amend. VI (speedy trial, impartial jury, confrontation, and compulsory-process guarantees); id. 
amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishment); see also id. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures). I note the Fourth Amendment last because at the founding, it was not solely 
(or perhaps even primarily) aimed at criminal proceedings as such. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994) (“[U]nlike the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Amendments, which specially apply in criminal contexts, the Fourth Amendment applies 
equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.”). 
 8. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights was understood to apply only to the 
federal government. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 243 (1833). 
 9. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261–62 
(1993). 
 10. See id. at 261–67. 
 11. Id. at 267–69. 
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criminal prosecutions.12 But over the coming years, the Court would 
increasingly use the hook of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause in order to regulate the state criminal process. This 
effort picked up steam slowly at first; before 1920, the Supreme Court 
had overturned only a small number of state court convictions.13 By 
1940, the Court had become more aggressive in its interventions.14 Yet 
as late as 1960, there was still not “a substantial body of law regulating 
the criminal process.”15 
That finally changed in the 1960s. In that decade, the Warren 
Court dramatically expanded the scope of constitutional criminal 
procedure, imposing most of the requirements of the Bill of Rights on 
the state criminal process.16 Mapp v. Ohio17 imposed the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule on the states.18 Gideon v. Wainwright19 
guaranteed state-provided counsel in all serious criminal 
prosecutions.20 Miranda v. Arizona21 imposed an elaborate set of rules 
on police conducting interrogations.22 Massiah v. United States23 
prevented law enforcement from questioning defendants without 
counsel after indictment.24 Duncan v. Louisiana25 guaranteed trial by 
jury for non-petty offenses.26 Brady v. Maryland27 required 
prosecutors to give defendants exculpatory evidence.28 These cases 
and others “produced what is widely known as the ‘criminal procedure 
revolution.’”29 
Yet this revolutionary fervor did not last. Rising crime became a 
 
 12. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to require states to comply with 
Fifth Amendment’s grand-jury requirement). 
 13. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
48, 48 (2000). 
 14. Id. 
 15. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 79 (2d ed. 2005). 
 16. Id. at 80. 
 17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 18. Id. at 660. 
 19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 20. Id. at 339–40, 348. 
 21. 348 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 22. Id. at 444–45. 
 23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 24. Id. at 204–06. 
 25. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 26. Id. at 158–59. 
 27. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 28. Id. at 90–91. 
 29. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s 
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 (2004). 
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national political issue, and Richard Nixon was elected president in 
1968 on a platform that included sharp criticism of the Warren Court.30 
Nixon was ultimately able to replace four Justices, including Chief 
Justice Warren (with Warren Burger), and he and other Republican 
presidents were responsible for eleven straight appointments to the 
Court between 1969 and 1991.31 
The path of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine changed 
accordingly—if not immediately. The early Burger Court issued some 
opinions in the Warren Court spirit: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents32 recognized an implied constitutional tort cause of action 
against federal law-enforcement officers.33 And Furman v. Georgia34 
essentially struck down every death penalty statute on the books 
nationwide.35 But fairly quickly, the Court became less interested in 
heavy-handed supervision of criminal justice. In Gregg v. Georgia,36 
for example, the Court walked back from the precipice it had nearly 
jumped off in Furman just four years earlier, again approving states’ 
use of the death penalty.37  
Particularly notable about the new era was how the Court made it 
significantly harder to obtain meaningful remedies for constitutional 
violations.38 Teague v. Lane39 limited state prisoners’ right to rely on 
new constitutional procedural rules announced after their convictions 
became final.40 Harlow v. Fitzgerald41 precluded liability for 
constitutional torts unless the defendant violated “clearly established 
law,”42 a hole that the lower courts have driven trucks through with 
 
 30. See TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS 14–15 (2001). 
 31. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx. In my enumeration, William Rehnquist is 
counted twice, as he was first appointed by President Nixon in 1972 before being elevated to Chief 
Justice by President Reagan in 1986. Id.  
 32. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 422. 
 34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 35. Id. at 239–40. 
 36. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a gripping history of the Supreme Court’s capital punishment 
jurisprudence through Gregg, see EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE (2013). 
 37. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155. 
 38. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469 (1996). 
 39. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 40. Id. at 290. 
 41. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 42. Id. at 818. 
(6)51.2_EPPS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  4:12 PM 
384 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:379 
little objection from the Court.43 United States v. Leon44 recognized a 
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,45 and later cases have 
continued to create or expand further exceptions.46  
The last few decades have, to be sure, not provided an unbroken 
string of victories for government interests. Some scholars 
downplayed the idea that the Burger Court had effected a counter-
revolution in criminal procedure.47 In 1984, the Court recognized a 
right to effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.48 
More recently, a line of Eighth Amendment decisions have restricted 
the circumstances under which capital punishment can be imposed,49 
as well as limiting the use of life without parole for juveniles.50 And 
the Court, in large part due to efforts by Justice Scalia, reinvigorated 
the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation and jury trial rights.51 
Still, in the bigger picture, it is hard to say that constitutional 
criminal procedure has had a particularly successful few decades. The 
United States prison population has grown to epidemic proportions.52 
A wave of DNA exonerations has undermined confidence in the 
 
 43. For a troubling recent example, see Young v. Borders, where the Eleventh Circuit extended 
qualified immunity when “police tactically surrounded the home’s only exit, drew their guns, 
repeatedly slammed on the door without identifying themselves as law enforcement, and then shot 
and killed [the occupant] when he opened the door, as he was stepping back into his home.” 850 
F.3d 1274, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The 
Court seems content with the breadth of qualified immunity, and indeed reaffirmed the doctrine’s 
importance during October Term 2016 in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
 44. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 45. Id. at 905. 
 46. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011) (holding that the good-faith 
doctrine applies when officers engage in unconstitutional search pursuant to binding but erroneous 
appellate precedent). 
 47. See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the 
Warren Court, in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW 69, 72 (1982). 
 48. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Strickland broke little new ground, however; by 1984, “all 
the Federal Courts of Appeals and all but a few state courts” had recognized a constitutional right 
to “reasonably effective assistance” at trial. Id. at 683. 
 49. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (barring death penalty for child rape); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (forbidding capital punishment for juvenile 
defendants); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (forbidding capital punishment for 
intellectually disabled defendants). 
 50. See Miller v. Alabama 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (barring mandatory life without parole 
for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (forbidding life without parole for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders). 
 51. See infra notes 86–87. 
 52. Numerous observers in recent years have decried “mass incarceration.” See, e.g., TODD R. 
CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE (2014); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, 
CAUGHT (2014); JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN 1 (2017). 
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accuracy of adjudicative processes.53 The justice system continues to 
produce disparate outcomes that are hard to call anything other than 
racist.54 And despite increasing public attention to the problem of 
police violence, it remains difficult for victims to obtain justice 
through either tort suits55 or criminal prosecution.56 The Supreme 
Court has done little to address these problems.57 
Quite recently, though, there were glimmers of change. Support 
for criminal justice reform had become increasingly mainstream, 
causing some scholars to argue that the political phenomenon that had 
driven mass incarceration was on its way out.58 On the Court, several 
justices indicated interest in significant expansions of rights. Justice 
Breyer wrote to announce his newfound view that the death penalty 
was categorically cruel and unusual punishment, and Justice Ginsburg 
joined him.59 Justice Kennedy signaled interest in declaring solitary 
confinement unconstitutional.60 Justice Sotomayor made an 
impassioned plea for the Court to take greater account of how police 
practices impact people of color.61 The Obama administration made 
some high-profile moves related to criminal justice issues,62 and the 
President himself even published an article in the Harvard Law 
 
 53. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (analyzing the 
first 250 wrongful convictions that were later overturned based on DNA testing). 
 54. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that 
the criminal justice system is a modern system of racial control). 
 55. Qualified immunity remains a difficult bar for plaintiffs to clear. See supra note 43. 
 56. See, e.g., Reuben Fischer-Baum, Allegations of Police Misconduct Rarely Result In 
Charges, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features 
/allegations-of-police-misconduct-rarely-result-in-charges/. 
 57. In some cases, the Supreme Court has exacerbated them. For example, the Court 
aggressively reined in damages suits against law-enforcement officers via its summary-reversal 
power. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 1, 3 (2015) (noting multiple pro-government summary reversals in cases arising under § 
1983); Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (noting “a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources” in 
summary reversals). 
 58. See CLEAR & FROST, supra note 52. For an opposing view arguing that the political forces 
supporting mass incarceration are powerful and will not disappear overnight, see GOTTSCHALK, 
supra note 52. 
 59. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 62. For example, the Department of Justice announced efforts to reduce reliance on private 
prisons. This directive was quickly rescinded by new Attorney General Jeff Sessions. See Matt 
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Review trumpeting his efforts.63 
And as the 2016 election approached, it looked like liberals might 
finally have a chance to control the Supreme Court after so long in the 
wilderness. Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016 created an 
immediate vacancy. And it seemed possible, or even likely, that more 
vacancies on the Court would follow in short order, given the age of 
several of the sitting Justices. Tushnet likely spoke for many when he 
announced the impending end of “defensive crouch 
constitutionalism.”64 
To be sure, it was not obvious that change on criminal justice 
issues would happen overnight. President Obama’s nominee, Merrick 
Garland, appeared fairly conservative on criminal issues.65 Still, it was 
not totally clear that Clinton would re-nominate Garland if she won. 
And even if Garland took the bench, other, more liberal Justices might 
soon join him. It seemed not unrealistic to predict, for example, that 
soon a majority of the Court might hold the death penalty categorically 
forbidden.66 
But then, of course, Donald Trump shocked the world by winning 
the election. 
II.  WINTER IS COMING 
Compared to what might have been, it’s hard to overstate the 
consequences of the 2016 election for constitutional criminal 
procedure. Had things gone the other way, we might have seen a new 
flowering of rights and protections. Instead, what now approaches is a 
true winter for criminal procedure. A time of darkness and retreat. At 
the very least, a time in which little new can take root and grow. 
Begin with the near future. Justice Gorsuch sits in Justice Scalia’s 
seat. We don’t know for sure how Justice Gorsuch might vote on 
criminal issues over the course of his career. He has been on the Court 
for a relatively short time, and we haven’t seen his votes in many 
 
 63. See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811 (2017). 
 64. See Tushnet, supra note 1. 
 65. See Charlie Savage, In Criminal Rulings, Garland Has Usually Sided with Law 
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/us/politics 
/merrick-garland-supreme-court-nominee.html.  
 66. See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH 255–80 (2016) 
(exploring the possibility that the Supreme Court could soon declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional). 
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criminal cases yet. But the few data points we have, plus a larger set 
of opinions from his time as a judge on the Tenth Circuit, provide 
some information. In what follows, I’ll provide a brief analysis of 
Justice Gorsuch’s criminal jurisprudence. That analysis has some 
intrinsic interest, but it’s especially useful because of the seemingly 
close parallels between Justice Gorsuch’s approach and that of his 
predecessor, Justice Scalia. I’ll offer some thoughts as to what I think 
is good in the Scalia/Gorsuch approach, but I’ll also stress the ways in 
which that approach is unable to address the most significant problems 
faced by the criminal justice system. Recognizing the shortcomings of 
the formalism championed by Justice Scalia, and that we should 
expect Justice Gorsuch to champion, is especially valuable, because 
that approach seems like the realistic best-case scenario for new 
appointments to the Court in the next few years.  
Start with the good news. Justice Gorsuch won’t be a reflexive 
vote in favor of the government’s interests in criminal cases. He 
compares favorably to some of the potential alternatives—such as 
Eleventh Circuit Judge William Pryor, who could have been expected 
to vote more like Justice Alito (who usually favors government 
interests) on criminal issues. In some of his circuit opinions, Judge 
Gorsuch has appeared quite solicitous of defendants’ rights—at least 
where those rights line up with his understanding of the Constitution’s 
original meaning.  
For example, in both United States v. Carloss67 and United States 
v. Ackerman,68 then-Judge Gorsuch ruled in favor of Fourth 
Amendment claims using originalist reasoning based on premises 
about common-law property protections,69 an approach that Justice 
Gorsuch has seemed to adhere to in questions in oral argument in 
recent Fourth Amendment cases.70 The journalist Radley Balko, an 
expert on police violence,71 found these decisions “encouraging.”72 In 
 
 67. 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 68. 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 69. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1006; Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1301. 
 70. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, 46, Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) 
(No. 16-1371); Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–46, Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) 
(No. 16-1027); Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 
(2018) (No. 16-402). 
 71. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP (2013). 
 72. Radley Balko, In Gorsuch, Trump Gave Democrats a Gift. They Should Take It., WASH. 
POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/02/01/in-
gorsuch-trump-gave-democrats-a-gift-they-should-take-it/?utm_term=.7be7eef7de17. 
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Balko’s eyes, these opinions show that Justice Gorsuch is likely to hew 
closely to the Fourth Amendment approach of Justice Scalia, who 
“was often very good on the Fourth Amendment.”73  
Balko’s assessment of Justice Scalia is correct as far as the 
substance of the Fourth Amendment is concerned. Especially in his 
later years on the Court, Justice Scalia wrote a number of important 
opinions defending Fourth Amendment rights. In Kyllo v. United 
States,74 Justice Scalia concluded that police use of a thermal imaging 
device was a search normally requiring a warrant.75 So too with GPS 
devices attached to cars in United States v. Jones.76 Likewise, he 
authored the 5-4 opinion in Florida v. Jardines77 holding that police 
use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch was a search.78 In 
Maryland v. King,79 another 5-4 decision, he dissented forcefully, 
arguing that taking DNA swabs from arrestees based on suspicion was 
unconstitutional.80 And in Arizona v. Gant,81 he provided the fifth vote 
to abandon a broad reading of New York v. Belton82 that permitted 
automobile searches incident to the driver’s arrest for any crime.83 
Though Justice Scalia’s record as a Fourth Amendment champion is 
not spotless,84 other good examples exist.85 
Justice Scalia also defended defendants’ rights in two aspects of 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence: the jury trial right86 and the 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 34–35. 
 76. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 77. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 78. Id. at 11–12. 
 79. 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 80. Id. at 469. 
 81. 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 82. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 83. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351–54. 
 84. Most notably, he authored Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which has been 
heavily criticized for approving the use of routine traffic stops as a pretext for investigating other 
crimes based on racial profiling. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but 
Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 (2015) (citing criticism). Whren, however, was a unanimous decision, so 
it’s therefore weak evidence that Justice Scalia was particularly pro-government on Fourth 
Amendment issues. More troubling, perhaps, is his majority vote in the 5-4 Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), which permitted arrests for the violation of any crime. 
 85. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(explaining why police lack authority to detain departing occupants of a home when executing a 
search warrant there). 
 86. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires that juries, 
not judges, find facts that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Justice 
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Confrontation Clause.87 On these issues, however, we have much less 
guidance from Judge Gorsuch’s lower court opinions. A recent Sixth 
Amendment-focused analysis of those opinions found few useful data 
points outside of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context.88 
But elsewhere there is more evidence of Justice Gorsuch’s 
affinity for Justice Scalia’s approach to criminal cases. Consider 
United States v. Games-Perez,89 where then-Judge Gorsuch displayed 
a flair for textualism in criminal law—another Scalia trademark.90 The 
defendant in Games-Perez was convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a weapon.91 On appeal, he argued that the government 
should have had to prove he knew he was a felon when he possessed 
the weapon.92 The majority rejected his argument as foreclosed by 
circuit precedent.93  
Judge Gorsuch concurred in the judgment.94 Though he found the 
case “easy” given precedent, he argued that the prior decision “simply 
can’t be squared with the text of the relevant statutes” and “defies 
 
Scalia played a crucial role in laying the intellectual foundation for these holdings. See, e.g., 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 87. Dissenting in Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia argued that the majority had lost sight of 
the Confrontation Clause’s meaning. See 497 U.S. 836, 863 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
Justice Scalia’s reading of the Confrontation Clause ultimately prevailed in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004), overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 56–57 (1980). 
 88. See Abbee Cox & Katherine Moy, Restraint and the Rights of Criminal Defendants: Judge 
Gorsuch on the Sixth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 140, 143 (2017). The authors 
concluded that Judge Gorsuch’s approach in ineffective-assistance cases was fairly government-
friendly. See id. at 143–45. Justice Gorsuch’s votes as a Supreme Court justice provide some 
confirmation of that prediction; he joined the 5-4 majority in Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 
(2017), which held that federal habeas courts may not consider a procedurally defaulted claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel even if state post-conviction counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise that claim. Id. at 2062–64. 
 89. 667 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 90. Justice Scalia often urged narrow textual readings of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Sekhar v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2723–27 (2013) (holding that Hobbs Act extortion does not include 
“attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment”); United 
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (upholding a narrow definition of 
bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201). To be sure, though, Justice Scalia was an equal-opportunity 
textualist. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 399, 408 (1998) (rejecting “an exception 
to criminal liability under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for a false statement that consists of the mere denial 
of wrongdoing, the so-called ‘exculpatory no’”). 
 91. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1136. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1140. 
 94. Id. at 1142. 
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linguistic sense.”95 When the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, 
Judge Gorsuch dissented, stressing the human stakes involved. “There 
can be fewer graver injustices in a society governed by the rule of law 
than imprisoning a man without requiring proof of his guilt under the 
written laws of the land,” he lamented.96 
Games-Perez concerns substantive criminal law, not criminal 
procedure. But Justice Gorsuch’s opinions read as if they are 
motivated by concerns about constitutional values, rather than merely 
a preference for textualism for its own sake. Put another way: while 
there are many reasons one might endorse textualism,97 Justice 
Gorsuch seems drawn to textualism at least in part because of deep-
seated views about rule-of-law values. His concern for ensuring that 
defendants are convicted only under the correct interpretation of a 
criminal statute seems rooted in a faith that strictly following the 
formal separation of powers is the key to preserving liberty. 
Indeed, one of the few data points from Justice Gorsuch’s brief 
tenure on the Supreme Court supports this take. In Hicks v. United 
States,98 he concurred in the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, vacate 
the judgment below, and remand for further consideration.99 The 
defendant had been sentenced to a 20-year mandatory minimum under 
a statute that was repealed by the Fair Sentencing Act before his 
sentencing.100 The Court held in Dorsey v. United States101 that 
defendants in that position were entitled to the benefit of the amended, 
more lenient, sentencing regime.102 The defendant in Hicks, though, 
had failed to make that argument on appeal.103 Over the Chief Justice’s 
strong objection, Justice Gorsuch agreed that Hicks should get to 
argue to the court of appeals that his sentence was plain error entitling 
him to relief.104 Apparently troubled that “a man was wrongly 
 
 95. Id. at 1143 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 96. United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 97. For example, Adrian Vermeule defends textualism under an institutional rationale, arguing 
that, given judges’ limited capacities for acquiring information, the costs of judicial inquiry into 
extra-textual sources when interpreting statutes outweigh any benefits. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 183–205 (2006). 
 98. 137 S. Ct. 2000 (2017) (mem.). 
 99. Id. at 2000 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 567 U.S. 260 (2012). 
 102. Id. at 261. 
 103. Hicks, 137 S. Ct. at 2000. 
 104. Id. 
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sentenced to 20 years in prison,” Justice Gorsuch could not “think of 
a good reason to say no” to the defendant’s request.105  
In several other circuit opinions, then-Judge Gorsuch wrote 
separately to emphasize separation-of-powers concerns. In United 
States v. Nichols,106 for example, he dissented from denial of rehearing 
en banc to argue that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act107 (SORNA) improperly delegated to the Attorney General the 
power to decide “whether and on what terms sex offenders convicted 
before the date of SORNA’s enactment should be required to register 
their location or face another criminal conviction.”108 He argued that 
“[i]f the separation of powers means anything, it must mean that the 
prosecutor isn’t allowed to define the crimes he gets to enforce.”109 
And in two immigration opinions that have buoyed conservatives 
skeptical of the regulatory state, he questioned the Chevron doctrine 
on separation-of-powers grounds.110 
Here, again, Justice Gorsuch has much in common with his 
predecessor. Justice Scalia was a staunch defender of formalism in the 
separation of powers, as he made clear in his famous dissent in 
Morrison v. Olson,111 as well as in other writings.112 Indeed, Justice 
Scalia often voiced his view that separation-of-powers issues were 
more important than Bill of Rights cases.113 This was not because he 
thought individual rights were unimportant; instead, pointing to lofty 
individual-rights guarantees in the constitutions of totalitarian 
countries, he argued that rights were “not worth the paper they were 
printed on” if the constitution did not also “prevent the centralization 
of power in one man or one party, thus enabling the guarantees to be 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012). 
 108. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 668 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court ultimately reversed 
the defendant’s convictions on statutory grounds, thus avoiding any constitutional issue. See 
Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016). 
 109. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 668 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 110. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring); De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 111. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 112. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 901 (1991); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 465 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
 113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417 (2008). 
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ignored.”114 
Justice Gorsuch seems to share Justice Scalia’s view that 
“[s]tructure is everything.”115 Consider this, from a 2016 speech: 
To the founders, the legislative and judicial powers were 
distinct by nature and their separation was among the most 
important liberty-protecting devices of the constitutional 
design, an independent right of the people essential to the 
preservation of all other rights . . . . [R]ecognizing, 
defending, and yes policing, the legislative-judicial divide is 
critical to preserving other constitutional values like due 
process, equal protection, and the guarantee of a republican 
form of government.116 
In a broad sense, it’s hard to dispute the importance of 
constitutional separation of powers. As Madison recognized, a written 
constitution’s guarantees of individual rights would be mere 
“parchment barriers” in the absence of appropriate structural checks 
“against the encroaching spirit of power.”117 Some attention to 
dividing and diffusing governmental power is necessary, lest the Bill 
of Rights become as irrelevant as the Soviet Constitution, which 
Justice Scalia used as an example.118 
The problem, though, is that Justice Gorsuch, like Justice Scalia 
before him, seems to place more faith in the precise details of the 
founders’ design than is deserved. Put another way, both seemed to 
think—especially when it came to criminal justice—that judges’ only 
job is to adhere strictly to the fine-grained formal rules about 
separation of powers that they saw as required by the original meaning 
of the Constitution, and that judges need not consider how present 
arrangements practically map on to the concerns about concentrated 
power that so worried Madison and other framers. 
This point has the most relevance when it comes to plea 
bargaining, a practice that a chorus of commentators has sharply 
criticized.119 A consistent complaint is that our system’s approach to 
 
 114. Id. at 1418. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice 
Scalia, 66 CASE W. L. REV. 905, 912 (2016). 
 117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 118. See Scalia, supra note 113, at 1418. 
 119. One particularly common criticism is that plea bargaining is unfairly coercive, given the 
“trial penalty” that defendants pay if they insist on a jury trial. See, e.g., Conrad G. Brunk, The 
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plea bargaining—in which judges defer to prosecutors and provide 
little scrutiny of the bargaining process—puts far too much power in 
the hands of one person, the prosecutor. Rachel Barkow has argued, 
for example, that “the virtually unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion over charging and bargaining . . . stands in sharp tension 
with the separation of powers” laid out in the Constitution.120 Going 
even further, William Stuntz argued how a unity of interests on 
criminal justice issues between the political branches led to a strategy 
in which legislators broadly delegate to prosecutors by drafting overly 
broad laws and letting prosecutors decide who really deserves 
punishment through the only adjudicative process that really 
matters—the charging decision and plea negotiations.121 As he put it, 
the true role of substantive criminal law “is to empower prosecutors, 
who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”122 
Not everyone is quite so critical of the present state of affairs, to 
be sure.123 But even those who are less troubled by modern plea-
bargaining practices tend to recognize the realities of how power is 
actually concentrated. For example, Gerard Lynch—a former federal 
prosecutor, now a judge—has explained how, given the nature of plea 
bargaining today, prosecutors act as the frontline adjudicators in the 
criminal process.124  
Whatever the merits of this approach, it is hard to square with the 
simple, three-branch system of separated powers of the founder’s 
design. Today trials are the exception, not the rule; the bargaining 
process, not the jury trial, is the only adjudication that most defendants 
receive. Yet I fear that due to interpretive method, Justice Gorsuch—
like Justice Scalia before him—will simply be unwilling to grapple 
with this fundamental reality. 
Consider Williams v. Jones.125 Charged with first-degree murder, 
 
Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 527, 542–52 
(1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13–14 (1978). 
 120. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1044 (2006). 
 121. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 
(2001). 
 122. Id. 
 123. For the best argument for delegation to prosecutors via broadly drafted laws, see Samuel 
W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008). 
 124. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117 (1998). 
 125. 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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the defendant was offered a plea to second-degree murder with an 
accompanying ten-year prison term.126 Though the defendant wished 
to accept the deal, defense counsel was so convinced of his client’s 
innocence that he threatened to withdraw from representation if the 
defendant accepted the offer.127 The case went to trial; the defendant 
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without 
parole.128 The state court system agreed that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective, and ordered as a remedy a sentence of life 
with parole—the lowest sentence available for first-degree murder.129 
In a habeas posture, the Tenth Circuit panel majority found this 
remedy constitutionally inadequate.130 
Then-Judge Gorsuch dissented. He did not dispute that counsel 
was constitutionally deficient.131 Nonetheless, he argued that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the ineffectiveness.132 Because “the 
plea bargain is a matter of prosecutorial grace, not a matter of legal 
entitlement, a defendant who loses the chance for a deal cannot be said 
to have been treated unfairly,”133 at least if he is convicted “after an 
entirely fair trial.”134 When the en banc court denied rehearing, then-
Judge Gorsuch protested vehemently.135 
Here, again, Justice Gorsuch is on the same page as Justice Scalia. 
Three years after Williams, the Supreme Court addressed the same 
question in Lafler v. Cooper136 and Missouri v. Frye.137 Echoing Judge 
Gorsuch’s views, Justice Scalia lamented in Lafler that the majority 
was setting aside a conviction even though the defendant “received the 
exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal 
trial.”138 
My goal is not to quibble with Justice Gorsuch’s vote in Williams 
(or, really, even Justice Scalia’s in Lafler and Frye). My real concern 
is about what Williams reveals about how Justice Gorsuch thinks about 
 
 126. Id. at 1088. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1092–94. 
 131. Id. at 1096 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 1099. 
 133. Id. at 1101. 
 134. Id. at 1099. 
 135. Williams v. Jones, 583 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 136. 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
 137. 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
 138. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 186 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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criminal justice more generally. It is one thing to conclude that courts 
cannot create a judicially enforceable remedy when an attorney 
erroneously advises a defendant to go to trial and reject a plea offer. 
But to insist that “a defendant who loses the chance for a deal cannot 
be said to have been treated unfairly”? That requires ignoring 
reality.139 
Plea bargaining is how our system resolves the overwhelming 
majority of cases.140 For most defendants, getting a good deal is the 
whole ballgame. And in a world where legislators draft criminal 
penalties knowing that almost all cases will be disposed of via plea, 
the harsh sentences imposed on defendants who insist on trial look less 
like the appropriate baseline from which to measure the plea-
bargaining “discount,” and instead more like the “trial penalty” that 
many observers have decried.141 
In such a world, to insist that a plea bargain is merely “a matter 
of prosecutorial grace”142 seems to require willful blindness to how 
things really work. As the Lafler majority put it, the argument that “[a] 
fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel 
during plea bargaining . . . ignores the reality that criminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”143 
More generally, it’s baffling how a judge can say “[i]f the separation 
of powers means anything, it must mean that the prosecutor isn’t 
allowed to define the crimes he gets to enforce,”144 while elsewhere 
seeming so blasé about plea bargaining—a system that, as noted, is 
particularly troubling for how it effectively concentrates so much 
power in one person’s hands. 
But perhaps this all reads too much into Williams. Justice 
Gorsuch, in his off-the-bench comments, has expressed reservations 
about overcriminalization;145 someone who recognizes that problem 
should recognize the dangers that it poses when combined with plea 
 
 139. Williams, 571 F.3d at 1101 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 140. See, e.g., LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearch 
Summary.pdf (noting estimates “that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases 
are resolved through” plea bargaining). 
 141. See Stuntz supra note 121. 
 142. Williams, 571 F.3d at 1103. 
 143. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169–70. 
 144. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
 145. See Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 747–48 (2014). 
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bargaining. And perhaps Justice Gorsuch’s majority vote in Class v. 
United States,146 which held that a guilty plea does not inherently 
forfeit the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of 
conviction, suggests he will do more to rein in plea bargaining than 
Williams might suggest.147 Still, given all Justice Gorsuch’s 
similarities with Justice Scalia—and given that Justice Gorsuch 
himself seems to see Justice Scalia as a role model—it’s more than 
fair to ask whether the newer Justice’s jurisprudence will have the 
same limitations as that of the man whose seat he is filling. 
Those limitations were real indeed. Though there is plenty to 
admire in Justice Scalia’s decisions on the meaning of particular 
constitutional provisions, he seemed remarkably unconcerned about 
effective enforcement of constitutional rights. Take the Fourth 
Amendment. For all Justice Scalia’s bluster about fidelity to the 
founders’ values,148 he consistently voted against rulings that would 
meaningfully enforce those values. In other words, despite a solid 
record on the substance of Fourth Amendment law, his record on 
Fourth Amendment remedies was weak.  
He appeared dead-set against the exclusionary rule: He wrote 
Hudson v. Michigan,149 which made the suppression remedy 
unavailable for violations of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-
announce requirement.150 And he joined other opinions expanding 
further exceptions to exclusion.151 To be sure, the exclusionary rule 
was a twentieth-century innovation, and so perhaps it’s unsurprising 
that Justice Scalia, as a committed originalist, would disfavor it. But 
damages remedies for unreasonable searches and seizures, by contrast, 
were well known at the Founding.152 Yet here too, Justice Scalia’s 
contribution was mainly to limit access to meaningful remedies. He 
favored expanding qualified immunity,153 making suits against 
 
 146. 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018). 
 147. Id. at 803. 
 148. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that 
the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths 
for royal inspection.”). 
 149. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 150. Id. at 599. 
 151. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); see also Orin Kerr, The Court after 
Scalia: Scalia’s Absence May Help Preserve the Exclusionary Rule, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 
2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalias-absence-
may-help-preserve-the-exclusionary-rule/. 
 152. See Amar, supra note 7, at 774. 
 153. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–43 (2011). 
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defendants who violated the constitution more difficult. And he also 
seemed to be no particular fan of liability for municipalities whose 
employees violated constitutional rights either.154 
Yet if significant barriers exist for all of those potential 
remedies—exclusion, a suit against an individual officer, or a suit 
against the officer’s employer—it’s unclear what meaningful work 
substantive Fourth Amendment law is doing. If only a violation of 
“clearly established” law or an unconstitutional municipal policy 
enables a damages remedy, and if exclusion only applies when the 
violation is the result of willful wrongdoing (a direction in which the 
law seems to be heading)—many, perhaps most, violations of the 
Fourth Amendment will trigger no remedy. In such a world, 
government actors’ incentives to shape their conduct to the Fourth 
Amendment letter—rather than merely to avoid the most egregious 
violations—are quite attenuated. 
It’s unclear whether Justice Gorsuch’s approach to Fourth 
Amendment remedies is as limited as Justice Scalia’s. The evidence is 
equivocal. On the Tenth Circuit, he upheld the rights of plaintiffs to 
seek damages for constitutional violations.155 He dissented when his 
colleagues granted an officer qualified immunity after arresting a 
seventh grader for “trading fake burps for laughs in gym class.”156 
Nonetheless, an examination of his body of work in this area found 
that Justice Gorsuch “harbors a robust—though not boundless—vision 
of qualified immunity.”157 Exactly how boundless a vision remains to 
be seen. 
But let us emerge from the weeds. In the bigger picture, it seems 
fair to predict that Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence on criminal issues 
will look much like Justice Scalia’s. It will have many of the same 
virtues—a principled insistence on following the letter of the 
Constitution, even if doing so results in letting a criminal go free. But 
it will likely suffer from the same deficiencies, too. Like Justice Scalia, 
Justice Gorsuch will probably be quite talented at writing opinions 
zeroing in on the meaning of individual constitutional provisions, but 
 
 154. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72–76 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 155. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 902 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with majority’s reversal of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant). 
 156. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1169 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 157. Shannon M. Grammel, Judge Gorsuch on Qualified Immunity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
163, 163 (2017). 
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he will be less likely to take consideration of how the larger legal 
framework effectuates or stymies underlying constitutional values. 
One whose vision is finely trained at discerning individual trees, but 
less able to see (or, perhaps, less interested in seeing) the forest as a 
whole. 
What should be most sobering, though, is that going forward 
Justice Gorsuch likely represents the best-case scenario from the 
perspective of those who favor strong criminal procedure protections. 
And things seem likely to get worse: In summer 2018, Justice 
Kennedy retired and was replaced by Brett Kavanaugh after a 
contentious confirmation battle.158 If Justice Kavanaugh turns out to 
be more conservative on criminal procedure issues than his 
predecessor—which seems likely—a number of precedents will be in 
jeopardy.159 Indeed, the real question is likely to be whether Justice 
Kavanaugh will be a conservative like Justices Gorsuch and Scalia—
whose originalist approach leads to results that favor defendants in 
some classes of cases—or one like Justice Alito, who is generally 
deferential to the government.  
Even if the Court doesn’t significantly contract existing doctrine, 
the more important point is that there is little prospect that the Court 
will significantly expand criminal procedure rights in the coming 
years, as reformers had hoped. It seems unlikely that Justice Breyer 
will get to five votes in his quest to declare the death penalty 
categorically impermissible. Nor, with his retirement, will Justice 
Kennedy ever get a chance to create constitutional doctrine limiting 
solitary confinement. 
Most fundamentally, no one should expect the coming Court to 
take on responsibility for addressing the larger problems with 
 
 158. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-
supreme-court.html. 
 159. Over the years, Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote in several important cases 
involving criminal justice. Most notable are the line of Eighth Amendment cases categorically 
limiting the imposition of particular punishments for particular classes of defendants. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (forbidding, by a 5-4 vote, mandatory life without parole 
for juvenile defendants); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (forbidding, by a 5-4 vote, 
capital punishment for the crime of child rape). Perhaps the most important example outside the 
Eighth Amendment context is J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 263 (2011) (holding, by a 5-
4 vote, that a child’s age is relevant to whether he is in custody for purposes of Miranda). See also 
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 499 (2011) (upholding, by a 5-4 vote, an order requiring California 
to release prisoners to remedy “serious constitutional violations in California’s prison system” that 
“persisted for years”). 
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American criminal justice. Mass incarceration, racial disparities in 
punishment, over-use of lethal force by police officers, prosecutorial 
misconduct, prison conditions, and civil forfeiture abuse are all 
problems that the political process has, thus far, been unable to solve 
on its own. Yet reformers will need to look beyond the Court for help. 
Where there is a clear and specific textual hook to an enumerated 
constitutional provision, the Court could further the cause of 
reform.160 But the Justices likely to control the Court will not view it 
as their role to think creatively about how constitutional law can be 
brought to bear to improve the larger problems with the criminal 
justice system. 
Perhaps that is all as it should be. There are good arguments that, 
in a system of separated powers, judges shouldn’t think of themselves 
as having a roving commission to solve all the problems with the 
criminal justice system. My goal here is not to resolve that question. 
Instead, what matters here is a prediction: given the likely composition 
of the Court going forward, reformers will not be able to look to the 
federal judiciary to rescue the criminal justice system from problems 
created by democratic failure. 
III.  THE PATH FORWARD 
I’ve tried to predict the near future of constitutional criminal 
procedure. Perhaps those predictions are wrong. But assuming they 
are mostly right—what then? As I see it, there are a number of lessons 
that scholars—in particular, those who are at least partly motivated by 
a desire to reform the criminal justice system—should draw. In my 
view, scholars should reevaluate their assumptions about the role of 
courts in light of a future where there is little reason to expect counter-
majoritarian heroics from the Supreme Court. 
Criminal procedure scholarship and pedagogy was long 
dominated by a narrow focus on courts and on the Supreme Court in 
particular.161 This emphasis made sense, at least if one thinks of 
criminal procedure as “basically, a subset of constitutional law” in 
 
 160. Justice Thomas recently suggested he has concerns about the constitutionality of civil 
forfeiture. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017) (mem.) (Statement of Thomas, J.). 
 161. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 789 (2003) (“For four decades, criminal procedure scholars have focused on 
federal constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2005) (“[T]hinking about criminal procedure has 
tended to focus on the questions taken up by courts . . . .”). 
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which “the Supreme Court makes the relevant policy judgments.”162 
Scholarly articles thus often focused on judicial doctrine and couched 
reform proposals in the form of judge-directed arguments for doctrinal 
revision. 
In recent decades, however, scholars came to realize that a great 
deal about criminal procedure that mattered was not captured by a 
study of case law. And so there has been a commendable shift towards 
focusing less on doctrine as such, and more on how criminal 
procedure’s “abstract rules play out in the real world.”163 Scholars 
routinely ask questions that reading Supreme Court cases alone cannot 
answer—questions about racial disparities in criminal justice,164 the 
collateral consequences of arrests,165 and the realities of prosecutorial 
decision-making,166 to name a few. And such scholarship, to the extent 
that it is accompanied by any policy recommendations, is not always 
directed at a judicial audience. 
The decline of court-focused scholarship seems likely to continue 
if the courts become even less willing to intervene in the criminal 
justice system than they have been recently. To be sure, many forms 
of doctrinal scholarship still have great value; scholars do a great 
service by clarifying, organizing, and reconceptualizing the case law. 
But what is less likely to be particularly helpful is scholarship seeking 
to advance the cause of criminal justice reform using arguments 
directed at courts. 
If such scholarship continues, it will be most fruitful to the extent 
that it is aimed at developing “conservative” arguments for criminal 
procedure protections. For example, consider recent work by both 
Beth Colgan and John Stinneford, both using historical evidence to 
argue in favor of understandings of the Eighth Amendment that are 
broader than those the Justices sympathetic to originalism have thus 
far been willing to embrace.167 Or take William Baude’s recent claim 
that qualified immunity doctrine cannot be squared with fundamental 
 
 162. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997). 
 163. Bibas, supra note 161, at 790. 
 164. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: 
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 1 (2013). 
 165. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015). 
 166. See, e.g., Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775 (2016). 
 167. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014); 
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008). 
(6)51.2_EPPS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  4:12 PM 
2018] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN WINTER 401 
principles of statutory interpretation,168 an argument to which Justice 
Thomas recently indicated he might be receptive.169 While there is no 
guarantee that arguments like these will translate into changed 
doctrine (nor is that necessarily these particular authors’ goals), such 
work is at least written in conservative judges’ and justices’ native 
language. Reform-minded scholarship directed at judges that proceeds 
largely from arguments about fairness and empirical realities, or that 
seeks to build on Warren Court-vintage cases without rooting its legal 
arguments further back in history, is unlikely to persuade a majority 
of the justices anytime soon. 
But the situation today should prompt even deeper soul searching 
among students of criminal procedure. For a long time, scholars 
argued (or just assumed) that courts were the appropriate institutions 
to regulate the criminal justice system. Such an assumption made 
sense in a world where political actors had failed to set meaningful 
limits on law enforcement and where courts were ready and willing to 
step in. As Anthony Amsterdam made the point regarding the 
regulation of police practices, constitutional regulation was necessary 
in light of “longtime, wholesale ‘legislative default.’”170 
Indeed, that basic insight developed into the near-consensus 
justification for the Court’s efforts during the revolutionary Warren 
Court years. The dominant narrative justifying the Court’s aggressive 
intervention draws on John Hart Ely’s political process theory.171 
Voters and their elected representatives lack sufficient regard for the 
interests of criminal suspects and defendants, the story goes. Courts—
which are somewhat insulated from democratic political pressures—
must step in to fill the void and provide appropriate regulation that 
political actors will not.172 Criminal procedure’s longstanding focus 
 
 168. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018). 
 169. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment) (citing Baude, supra note 168) (noting that “some evidence supports the conclusion 
that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine”). 
 170. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
378 (1974). Amsterdam, though, did not treat courts as the complete solution; he also envisioned 
an important role for police self-regulation. See id. at 379. 
 171. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 172. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public 
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1079, 1093–94 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 850 (1994); see also William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-
Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 21 (1996) (“If there is a consensus theory of why 
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on courts, then, rested not just on the positive view that judicially 
created doctrine provided the rules that mattered, but also on a 
normative view about courts as the best-situated regulators of criminal 
justice. 
In recent years, however, many scholars have started to urge a 
different course. There are several criticisms of the conventional 
argument in favor of courts. Perhaps the most common one is that 
courts simply lack the institutional capacity to regulate the criminal 
justice system effectively.173 Courts, by design, can only intervene in 
the context of individual cases. This fact limits both their perspective 
(as many problems in the criminal justice system are systemic or 
structural) and their toolkit for solving constitutional problems. For 
this reason, a nascent movement has argued for a greater reliance on 
administrative agencies to regulate criminal justice.174 Along similar 
lines, Orin Kerr makes a case for broader deference to legislatures, at 
least in areas like the regulation of emerging technologies where, he 
argues, courts are at a comparative institutional disadvantage.175 There 
are other criticisms of courts, too; Stuntz went so far as to argue that 
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure by courts had perverse 
effects, contributing in part to mass incarceration.176 
But other scholars have come out to defend courts from the 
skeptics. David Sklansky argues that Kerr and other critics of courts 
have overstated legislatures’ willingness and ability to meaningfully 
protect privacy.177 Andrew Crespo contends that courts actually have 
a much greater capacity to understand “systemic facts” about the 
criminal justice system than most have assumed.178 And Stephen 
Schulhofer has strongly challenged Stuntz’s perversity critique, 
arguing that evidence of any causal link between the Court’s rulings 
 
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions got it right, the Carolene Products-Ely argument 
is it.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1827, 1865–77 (2015). 
 174. See, e.g., id.; Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1109–12 (2016). 
 175. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–82 (2004). 
 176. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–43 
(2011). 
 177. See David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think about Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (2015). 
 178. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal 
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2050 (2016). 
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and penal severity is lacking.179 
Present circumstances provide no clear answers to these debates. 
Yet, in my view, the situation raises even deeper questions. As noted, 
scholars have long looked to courts given their comparative 
advantages in political insulation. The story goes that courts must 
solve the problems that the political process cannot—or, perhaps more 
accurately, courts must solve the problems the political process 
creates. But it should be clear that the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
come to criminal defendants’ rescue anytime soon. Given where 
things stand, it seems appropriate to ask whether the notion of courts 
as the cure for democratic failure really makes sense at all. Here, I 
confess to being a skeptic. The problem, as I see it, is that courts do 
not stand outside of politics as much as the classic process theory 
argument imagines. Supreme Court Justices do not stand for election, 
sure. But they are chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
against a backdrop of public engagement. If voters and their elected 
officials really are strongly inclined towards severity on criminal 
matters, as scholars of criminal justice believe, the courts are unlikely 
to stand in the way—at least for any sustained period. 
The history of criminal procedure proves the point. For starters, 
it is not clear that even the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
revolution itself is a paradigmatic example of process theory in action. 
As Corinna Lain has argued, much of the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence accorded with majority preferences, or at 
least was not quite as politically controversial as we assume today.180 
But even if Lain overstates the case, it is hard to extricate the criminal 
procedure revolution from the larger context of the Court’s efforts to 
defeat the evils of segregation. As Klarman has shown, modern 
criminal procedure doctrine was born from cases dealing with Jim 
Crow justice.181 Indeed, a number of Warren Court criminal procedure 
cases at the very least had race in the background.182 Thus, “Warren-
era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of 
 
 179. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 176). 
 180. See generally Lain, supra note 29. 
 181. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 65. 
 182. For example, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), did not mention the race of the 
defendant, but was unmistakably a case about unfair racial caste enforcement. See Nancy J. King, 
Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 262 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
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antidiscrimination law.”183 Whether the criminal procedure revolution 
would have happened absent the unique history of race is hard to 
know. 
And even if the Warren Court cases lie within the process theory 
heartland, later events help illustrate that theory’s limits. After the 
high-water mark of the 1960s, Richard Nixon and later Presidents 
replaced the Warren Court Justices. With few exceptions, these 
appointments pushed the Court right on criminal issues. Since the 
1960s, the Court has not completely capitulated to the political 
branches, to be sure. It has not forsworn all the Warren Court 
precedents; and in some areas the Court has certainly recognized new 
rights.184 Yet few who envision a major regulatory role for courts 
would give the Justices’ efforts unqualified praise. The Court has done 
little to address, let alone solve, the biggest problems facing the 
criminal justice system. It has stayed on the sidelines as mass 
incarceration advanced. It has declined opportunities to stem racial 
profiling.185 And it has done much less than it could have to address 
police violence. 
Yet how realistic is it, really, to think the Court might have done 
more? The conventional narrative in criminal justice is that voters and 
their elected officials are not merely indifferent towards criminal 
issues, but that political winds blow strongly in favor of punitive 
policies.186 In such a world, could anyone realistically expect that 
tough-on-crime political forces would work tirelessly to change the 
law through legislative efforts and prosecutorial elections—but ignore 
judicial selection, and let the courts do whatever they want? Far from 
it, victims’ rights advocates and law-enforcement interests have a big 
voice in the nomination and confirmation process. It’s thus anything 
but surprising that, for example, several Justices have prosecutorial 
experience, but not a single former criminal defense attorney has sat 
 
 183. Stuntz, supra note 162, at 5. 
 184. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (overturning precedent that 
narrowly interpreted the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Atkins. v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002) (holding that mentally disabled defendants cannot be subject to capital punishment); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (recognizing that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 185. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 186. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 989, 1029–30 (2006). 
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on the Court in a quarter century.187 
Indeed, the nomination of Merrick Garland is telling. Despite 
being seen as a fairly reliable liberal vote on most issues, Garland 
seemed much more conservative in criminal cases—perhaps due to his 
service as a federal prosecutor.188 Despite some clucking from the 
liberal commentariat,189 President Obama faced no meaningful 
political pushback on the left.  
To be sure, as recounted above, there was some hope for real 
change on the Court had Hillary Clinton won. The election certainly 
could have gone differently, in which case the Court would suddenly 
be poised to do much more for the criminal justice system. Yet in that 
alternate universe, it would not be courts standing alone, defending 
individual rights against political actors determined to take those 
rights away. Instead, the people would have voted for the candidate 
who had made criminal justice reform part of her platform.190 Instead, 
of course, swing-state voters elected the candidate who used tough-
on-crime rhetoric not heard on the national stage in decades.  
Perhaps all this should be less surprising when we remember the 
context in which process theory arose. Ely’s theory was not solely—
or perhaps even primarily—a forward-looking project, mapping a 
course for courts to take. Instead, his (like some other famous 
constitutional theories of his era191) was at least in part a backward-
looking project of justification, one that particularly focused on the 
Warren Court’s liberal decisions.192 As a normative grounding for 
seemingly anti-democratic decisions, especially as carefully 
reconstructed by Michael Klarman,193 Ely’s theory has much to offer. 
 
 187. Dara Lind, There Hasn’t been a Criminal Defense Lawyer on the Supreme Court in 25 
Years. That’s a Problem., VOX (Mar. 22, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.vox.com 
/2016/3/28/11306422/supreme-court-prosecutors-career. 
 188. See Savage, supra note 65; see also Tom Goldstein, The Potential Nomination of Merrick 
Garland, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 26, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/the-
potential-nomination-of-merrick-garland. 
 189. See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, Inside Merrick Garland’s Troubling Record, SALON (Mar. 17, 
2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.salon.com/2016/03/17/inside_merrick_garlands_bleak_record _why 
_he_could_take_the_supreme_court_right_in_one_very_important_regard/. 
 190. See Criminal Justice Reform, THE OFFICE OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/criminal-justice-reform/. 
 191. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
 192. Ely’s dedication of his book to his former boss, Chief Justice Earl Warren, is telling in this 
regard. See ELY, supra note 171, at v (“For Earl Warren. / You don’t need many heroes / if you 
choose carefully.”). 
 193. See Klarman, supra note 13. 
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The idea that courts should step in to solve problems that the political 
process should, but for some structural reason cannot, answers the 
famous challenge of the “countermajoritarian difficulty”194 while also 
suggesting some outer bounds on the Court’s role. 
Yet as a predictive account of how courts actually will work, or 
as a prescriptive theory of how courts should work, process theory is 
much less appealing. It is one thing for courts to stand against political 
winds in isolated instances or for short periods. But to expect that they 
can and will do so indefinitely is unrealistic. The political process 
influences judicial selection. And precisely because (definitionally) 
political-process failures are unlikely to be remedied politically, that 
process is unlikely to select for judges who follow process theory. As 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule put it, “judicial behavior cannot be 
treated as exogenous or a deus ex machina—a miraculous intervention 
from outside the system.”195 And indeed, history bears out this 
critique; as Barry Friedman argues, far from being a consistently 
counter-majoritarian force, the Court has generally hewed “closely to 
the mainstream of popular judgment about the meaning of the 
Constitution.”196 And where the Court does reject mainstream opinion, 
it is likely to engender significant backlash—such as the vehement 
response of state legislatures to Furman, which likely contributed to 
the Court stepping away from the brink in Gregg.197 
The objection, to be clear, is not so much about courts’ ability to 
meaningfully regulate the criminal justice system if they wanted to. 
On this point, Crespo, for example, provides good arguments why 
courts could do more than the critics alleging “transactional myopia” 
believe.198 The concern, instead, goes to courts’ willingness to act as 
meaningful change agents, at least in any long-term, ongoing way. 
Courts unquestionably could do more. The problem is that they choose 
not to, and the reasons they do are predictable to the point of being 
 
 194. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (2d ed. 1986). 
 195. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1765 (2013). 
 196. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (1st ed. 2009). Whether the Justices are 
directly influenced by public opinion, or whether “the same forces that influence public opinion 
. . . influence judges simply because they are members of the public too” remains unclear. Either 
way, the result is the same. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 88 (2013). 
 197. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 
289–90 (2008) (describing “unprecedented speed and vehemence of the legislatures in reenacting 
their death penalty statutes” post-Furman). 
 198. See Crespo, supra note 178, at 2051–54. 
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essentially inevitable. 
This is not to say that courts have no comparative advantages over 
other institutions. Courts are more politically insulated than 
legislatures, and so it is not incoherent to think they might do 
somewhat more to protect defendants than legislatures will, at least on 
matters where tough-on-crime passions run particularly high.199 The 
problem, though, is that they are simply not insulated enough—and 
can never be insulated enough—to do all that criminal justice 
reformers would have them do. Perhaps courts have the ability to 
tackle and solve the biggest problems facing the criminal justice 
system. But even if they do, they simply are not willing to do so. And 
even if they were willing today, they would refuse tomorrow. If courts 
are the only hope, our hopes will be dashed in the end. 
But courts need not be the only hope. Here, I submit, criminal 
procedure has much to learn from public law more generally. For a 
time, liberal public law scholars, like criminal procedure scholars, saw 
in the Warren Court the promise of a cure for democratic failure. This 
period perhaps reached its peak with Frank Michelman’s 1969 
Harvard Law Review Foreword laying out the case for using the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a doctrinal weapon against poverty.200 But 
in the Nixon years and beyond, cases like Washington v. Davis201 
made clear that the courts would be much less active than many had 
hoped. 
Public-law scholars have grappled for decades with that reality. 
Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg have, for example, questioned courts’ 
ability to serve as agents of meaningful social change.202 Others, like 
Larry Kramer and Tushnet, have developed theories of popular 
constitutionalism in which the people themselves have a greater role 
in shaping and implementing constitutional values.203 Friedman has 
 
 199. For a compelling argument that legislatures are more likely to protect defendants when the 
crimes at issue are ones that legislators themselves, or those they know, might be accused of, see 
Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) 
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004). 
 200. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the 
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
 201. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 202. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2006); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2d ed. 2008). 
 203. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). Tushnet seems to have had no 
trouble getting over his objections to judicial review when it seemed like liberals might control the 
Court. See Tushnet, supra note 1. 
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shown how the Court has been more receptive to public opinion than 
people typically assume.204 
The point is not that each of these insights applies 
straightforwardly to the criminal justice context. Arguments against 
judicial review, for example, may not readily and directly translate to 
the criminal sphere, “where judicial engagement is unavoidable.”205 
The point, instead, is that public-law scholars have at least introduced 
a conceptual vocabulary that those studying the criminal justice 
system could build on in developing new ways of thinking for a new 
era. 
Skepticism of courts might seem hard to swallow in criminal 
justice, where it is an article of faith that courts are the only solution 
to a politics tilted against the interests of criminal defendants and 
suspects. But this is a lesson that must be learned. If courts cannot be 
relied upon to save society from democratic failure, the only 
alternative is to address democratic failure directly. Judge Learned 
Hand’s famous words come to mind: 
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no 
court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no 
court need save; that in a society which evades its 
responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that 
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.206 
For too long, too many have assumed that courts, and only courts, 
can defend the spirit of moderation when it comes to criminal justice. 
But this amounts to merely magical thinking. The best-designed legal 
arguments are no substitute for the harder work of political organizing 
and action. If the political system consistently produces bad outcomes, 
the only real and lasting solution is to work within the political system 
to change those outcomes. There are no shortcuts.  
This is not to say that legal scholars cannot effectuate change. 
Some scholarship can spur on social movements, drawing attention to 
problems and providing intellectual support for political efforts. 
Michelle Alexander’s work has been particularly successful in this 
regard.207 But scholars can also generate insights that can ultimately 
 
 204. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 196. 
 205. Crespo, supra note 178, at 2060. 
 206. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE 
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (3d ed., 1960). 
 207. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 220 (2017) (describing how Alexander’s 
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advance reform, even if the causal chain is less direct.  
Perhaps the most pressing need is deeper empirical knowledge; it 
is almost shocking how many things we don’t know about the 
system.208 For example, despite widespread consensus that mass 
incarceration is a terrible problem, there’s significant disagreement 
about who’s to blame. John Pfaff points the finger at prosecutors rather 
than legislators,209 but his findings are hotly contested.210 Other 
accounts emphasize race,211 political economy,212 and unique aspects 
of American culture.213 While answering these questions isn’t easy, 
making some progress would be immensely helpful. One cannot hope 
to cure an illness without understanding what disease is causing the 
symptoms. 
Other avenues of research have promise as well. Stuntz drew 
attention to the importance of structure in shaping policy in criminal 
justice.214 But more remains to be done. Though prosecutors are 
almost certainly the most powerful actors in criminal justice, our 
understanding of their motivations and behavior remains quite 
limited.215 And despite consensus that the politics of criminal justice 
are flawed, not enough has been done to help understand the 
relationship between structural features of the system and political 
conditions. Public law scholars have started to systematically examine 
how formal structural arrangements interact with underlying political 
conditions and power relationships.216 Extending that line of inquiry 
into criminal justice would be worthwhile. 
 
book “profoundly influenced” D.C. Council’s marijuana decriminalization debates). For a 
somewhat critical take on Alexander’s arguments, see James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass 
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012). 
 208. See Tom Meagher, 13 Important Questions About Criminal Justice We Can’t Answer, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 15, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/ 
05/15/13-important-questions-about-criminal-justice-we-can-t-answer#.qXdzRN5De; see also 
PFAFF, supra note 52, at 16–17 (2017). 
 209. See PFAFF, supra note 52. 
 210. See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 117 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018) (questioning Pfaff’s findings). 
 211. See ALEXANDER, supra note 54. 
 212. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (2008). 
 213. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE (2003). 
 214. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 176; Stuntz, supra note 121. 
 215. See Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 
846–51 (2016). 
 216. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016); 
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016). 
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That project holds great theoretical interest, but it also offers 
practical guidance. A deeper understanding of structure, and its 
relationship with political forces, could provide guidance for how 
reform could be effective. Though, as the conventional narrative tells 
us, political winds generally blow against defendants, those winds 
may be less strong at particular times. During brief windows when 
reform might be possible, it is critical that reformers know where their 
efforts might most fruitfully be directed. It would also help to have a 
better sense of which reform efforts are most likely to be durable in 
the face of shifting political winds; identifying structural reforms that 
might counteract political biases against criminal defendants should 
be a priority. Here, too, public law can help provide inspiration, as 
scholars have started to ask how reforms can be self-reinforcing 
through political entrenchment.217 
Federalism and localism also deserve renewed attention in 
criminal justice. Recently, a movement led by Heather Gerken has 
explored how devolving power to lower levels of government might 
actually serve ends typically associated with “nationalist” values.218 
Such an approach seems especially promising in criminal justice. The 
dominant paradigm in criminal procedure for the last century has been 
one in which a national Supreme Court nudged (or shoved) along state 
and local governments unwilling to do the right thing on their own. 
But this model may soon seem increasingly outmoded. Indeed, many 
have noticed that, in the same cycle that elected President Trump, 
several reform-minded district attorneys also won their races.219 At 
least in the medium term, reform appears likelier to come from the 
state, local, and community level than from the Court. Scholars have 
already directed efforts at community-level reforms,220 but likely more 
can be done. 
Many other questions are worth asking; here, I suggest only a few 
possibilities. There’s no guarantee that asking these questions will 
solve the criminal justice system’s problems. But it can’t hurt, and it 
has a better chance of being helpful than holding out hope, despite all 
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evidence to the contrary, that courts will come to the rescue. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The future that looms threatens to be a period of darkness for 
constitutional criminal procedure; perhaps even an end of one vision 
of the role of courts. But if nothing else, these circumstances give 
criminal procedure scholars an overdue opportunity to rethink 
assumptions about the role of courts and to ask new questions about 
structure, politics, localism, and power. What comes next need not be 
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